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Psychopathology of Altered
States of Consciousness

xpenences m

ment of self-determination in favour of obedien-

altered states
of consciousness have often been

ce to internal guidance. There are also problems of adjustment following transcendent, near-death and alien abduction experiences. Altogether, a mental health practitioner must listen to her client, keep an open mind and develop a keen sense of discrimination when evaluating experiences in altered states of cons-

misunderstood as
being pathological
when, in fact, they may be healthy or exceptionally beneficial. This appears to be, in part, because those who have had such experiences ha-

ve sometimes made claims that contradict the
predominant materialistic assumptions of much
ofWestern psychology. For example, those who
have had out-of-body experiences, possibly in
the context of near-death experiences, sometimes have claimed to have had veridical perceptions of physical events that they should not have been able to have had through their sensory
faculties. However, studies are summartzed indicating that remote perception without sensory
involvement can occur thereby emphasizing the
importance of evaluating experiences in altered states of consciousness without restrictive
preconceptions. In fact, from the point of view
of transcendent states of consciousness, the normal waking state appears to be the pathological
state. Clearly, however, not all experiences in
altered states of consciousness are free of difftculties. In striving for transcendence, there is a

large class of religious and spiritual problems
that includes crises associated with spiritual
awakening, cult participation and relinquish-
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ciousness.

Psychopathology of Altered States
of Consciousness

It is difficult to determine,

sometimes,
which behaviours should be considered
consistent with noffnal human functioning
and which should be considered pathological. This problem becomes compounded
when we open the door to the further reaches of the mind, as we do in altered states
of consciousness, and the distinction betAuthor b note. The author thanks Solveiga Miezltis
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ween madness and normality becomes blur
red. The purpose of this paper is to push
our understanding further by considering
what is pathology, normality and exceptio
nal well-being in altered states of cons
ciousness.

Pathology, Normality, and
Exceptional Well-Being

, b1e
\ t
is·e'31S·

;,

d
g
I•

d
s

Perhaps the first thing to note is that Wes
tern psychology is monophasic, that is to
say, its subject matter is almost exclusively
derived from a single state of conscious
ness, namely, the normal waking state. Furt
hennore, the normal waking state of cons
ciousness is considered the optimal state.
The presence of these characteristics of
Western psychology, in conjunction with
the prevalence of patbomorphism, the ten
dency to label psychological phenomena
using pathological categories, means that
experiences in altered states of conscious
ness have often been considered patholo
gical when they may, in fact, be better la
belled as normal or exceptionally benefi
cial. For example, shamanic journeying in
indigenous cultures may be undertaken by
a shaman in order to resolve a problem in
her community and involves her entering
an altered state of consciousness, experien
cing separation from her body, travelling
in a world different from ordinary reality,
encountering spirits, searching for informa
tion or power that can resolve the problem,
reentering her body and implementing the
results of the journey in the community.
While such experiences have often been
labelled as symptoms of schizophrenia, ca
reful comparison of shamanic journeying
to schizophrenia reveals that they are not
the same. In particular, for example, while
someone with schizophrenia experiences

disorganization and loss of control both for
the onset of schizophrenic episodes and
their contents, a shaman's journey is cha
racterized by coherent imagery, control of
the onset of the journey and partial control
of the contents of experience (Walsh,
1995).
However, even if experiences in alte
red states of consciousness were not pat
hologized, they may nonetheless create dis
ruption in a person's life and thus come to
the attention of mental health professionals.
Such disruption often occurs after near
death experiences. These are psychologi
cal events that are sometimes reported by
a person who has been close to death for
some period of time. A person may report
having experienced a feeling of peace, se
paration from her body, witnessing of
events occurring within the vicinity of her
body, encounters with deceased relatives
or spiritual beings, the presence of a lo
ving light, and a panoramic life review.
Subsequently, a person's ideas about the
nature of reality may be dramatically chan
ged. She may come to believe that death is
not the end of life, that our usual concerns
about our material well-being are unimpor
tant, and that the purpose of life is to love
one another. Despite the overall positive
nature of most near-death experiences, a
person may experience anger and depres
sion at having been brought back to life,
career interruptions, fear of ridicu1e and re
jection, alienation from one's relatives and
acquaintances, and broken relationships
including divorce from one's spouse. Many
of these problems result from a person's
inability to reconcile her altered sense of
reality and changed values with the mate
rialistic concerns of the people with whom
she must interact (Greyson, 2000).
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Psychology of Science

way around! Scientific theories change in
response to evidence. Scientists discard and

Perhaps we should pause before proceeding. After aII, psychology is a scientific
enterprise and should psychologists entertain such manifestly absurd notions as travelling outside of one's body and encountering spiritual beings? No matter how positive such experiences may be for the individual for whom they have occurred, is
there not something inherently wrong with
having impressions that one has teft one's
body or that one has communicated with
spirits? Indeed, psychologists write books

such as How

replace worldviews to reflect the results of
their investigations. Thus we now know,
from research in nuclear physics that matter is not made up of tiny tittiurd balls. Given that that is the case, there is no point in
continuing to insist that all phenomena, including consciousness, result from predictable interactions of tiny particles. The billiard ball schema has become obsolete (BaruSs, 1996).

What are we left with? What is the
world really like? What is happening when

to Think Straight About

someone says that she is outside her body?

Psychology (Stanovich, 2001) or, more pro-

What is the nature of out-of-body perceptions? Are they purely products of the imagination or are they veridical? Is it possible for there to be visual perception without
visual sensation? Is, in fact,the brain even
necess aty for the presence of consciousness? For a scientist, these are not matters
to be decided by one's a priori beliefs, but
research questions demanding empirical in-

vocatively, Psychobabble and Biobunk
(Tavris, 2001) in which such notions are
debunked in the name of scientific psycho-

logy. By all means, then, let us think
straight and cut through the psychobabble
of debunking itself using the methods and
knowledge base of scientific psychology.
In contemporary cognitive psychology
we have come to understand that human
beings organize their experiences using
cognitive structures called schem ata. In
particulag there are global schem ata, called worldviews that are used for making
sense of reality. Worldviews are mental
constructions, ideas, beliefs, theories, and
not themselves the reality for which they
are interpretations. The currently dominant
worldview in academia is that reality resembles a billiard table. All phenomena,

including consciousness, result from the
predictable interactions of tiny particles.
But authentic science, of which scientific
psychology is a part,is the pursuit ofknowledge using whatever means one can invent
to further one's understanding. The data acquired through one's investigations form
the basis for one's theories. Not the other
Bultijas PSIHOLOQIJAS ZUnNAh^S
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vestigation and critical evaluation of the
subsequent results. Is there any evidence
at all to suppose that the world is other than
it appears to be in its everyday manifestation?

Occurrence of Anomalous

Experiences

r

Let us consid er a case studied by Sabom
(1998) of a woman in the United States who
had aneardeath experience. In order to excise an aneurysm in her brain, a surgical
procedure known as hypothermic cardiac
arrest was used. During this procedure, her
body temperature was lowered to 60 degrees Fahrenheit, her heartbeat and breathing were stopped, and her brain activity
was reduced to the point where there were
L
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no brain waves over the cerebral cortex and

no auditory evoked potentials in response
to 100-decibel clicks, indicating a suppres-

sion of both cerebral and brain stem activity. Then the blood was drained from her
head. In the past, different measures have
been used for the presence of life, such as
breathing, heartb eat, cerebral brain activity
and brain stem activity. By any of these
measures, the woman was dead. However,
subsequent to the operation, she gave the

following account of her experiences.
As the bone saw cut through her skull,
the woman had the impression of leaving
her body through the top of her head and
looking down on the proceedings in the
operating room. Her description of events,
including, for example, her description of
the bone saw, turned out to be coffect even
though she had been anaesthettzed and her
eyes taped shut. As the operation progressed through the hypothermic cardiac arrest,
she had the impression of being transported as though she were going up in an elevator. She heard her grandmother calling
her toward a light at the end of a tunnel.
As she moved toward the light, it increased in size until she was overwhelmed by
its brightness. She could discern not only
her grandmother, but other relatives in the
light. After some time with them, her uncle brought her back through the end of the
tunnel. She could see her body. It looked
dead. She did not want to get back into it,

but she did. And then it hurt (Sabom,
1998). This case suggests the possibility
of visual perception without visual sensation and the possibility of the continuation
of consciousness without brain activity.
Ring and Cooper did a retrospective
study of the near-death and out=of-body experiences of 3 I blind people , 14 of whom
had been blind from birth. The accounts
of the near-death experiences of the 21 sub-

jects who had had them are consistent with
those of the sighted, including the presence of visual impressions for 15 of the 2l .
For those who had had near-death or outof-body experiences, 9 of the 14 subjects
who were congenitally blind reported visual impressions. Furtherrnore, some ofthose blind from birth who did not claim to
have seen anything app ear to have had visual elements but were unable to identify
them as such because of their lack of experience with sight. For those blind from
birth, the visual impressions in near-death

experiences are striking given that their
brains have never been developed for visual processing. Thus, for example, there
are no visual images in the dreams of those who have been blind from birth, yet they
were present in the near-death experiences of the congenitally blind participants
in the study. There was insufficient information from sighted witnesses to conclu-

sively corroborate the physical reality of
the out-of-body perceptions of the blind
that coffesponded to physical events at the
time of the experiences (Ring & Cooper,
1997). Nonetheless, this study lends credence to the possibility of visual perception without the presence of visual sensations

That remote perception, that is to say,
perception without relevant sensory stimulation, is possible, has been demonstrated
in a number of laboratofy studies. The research sponsored by the United States government in the 1970s at Stanford Research

Institute concernittg remote viewing, the
name given by Puthoff and Targ to anomalous perception at a distance, has become well known (Puthoff, 1996; Targ, 1996;
Targ &Katra, 1998), Subsequently, there
has been a spate of popular books about
the pu{ported military applications of remote viewing (e.g., Schnabel, 1997; Mo-
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rehouse, 1996, Graff, 2000; Mandelbaum,
2000). A similar research program was taken up at the Princeton Engineering Ano-

malies Research Laboratory in the late
1970s verifying the positive results of the
earlier government-sponsored studies (Jahn

& Dunno, 1987; Nelson, Dunne,

Dobyns

& Jahn, 1996). While participants in laboratory research concerning remote percep-

tion have usually been in a norrnal waking
state of consciousness, there is some evidence to suggest that the accuracy of remote perception is increased in altered sta-

tes of consciousness such as in a state of
hypnosis (Radin, 1997) and, indeed, that
anomalous events are more likely to occur
in altered states of consciousness (I(rippner & George, 1986). I should add the caveat about hypnosis, that one has to be ca-

mote perception is possible, has been listed as a symptom of schizotypal personality disorder (American Psychiatric Association,l994,p.645). We have just shown
that there are contexts in which experiences of remote perception may arise for someone and indicated that there is evidence
to support the veridical nature of some remote perceptions. In other words, belief in
clairvoyance is not, in and of itself, an illness, and hence, should not be treated as
such. However this is not the same as saying that those who believe in clairvoyance necessarily experience veridical remote

perceptions. Whether or not they do is a
matter of investigation in each particular
case. If someone believes that her remote
perceptions coffespond to reality when they
do not, then this diagnostic criterion beco-

reful about making universal statements
about its effects, given the varieties ofphe-

mes applicable. But not otherwise.

nomena to which the label of hypnosis has
been attached and the increased propensity

Pathology of Transcendence

for confabulation induced by hypnosis
(Kihlstrom, 1985; Frankel & Covino,

There is another domain in which there has
been a tendency in the past toward patho-

teeT).
A metanalysis of the extent to which
anomalous events coffespond to reality has
been given by Radin (1997) and a review
of the variety of anomalous experiences as
such can be found in Cardefra, Lynn and
Krippner (2000). Such summaries are beyond the scope of this paper. The point here is that one must pay attention to a person's account of her experiences without

morphism, namely thatof spiritual awakening, spiritual aspiration, self-transforrnation and the occurrence oftranscendent states of consciousness. However, rather than
being pathological, there is increasing evidence from research in the psychology of
religion that participation in religious activities is beneficial for one's well-being ,pdtticularly during times of stress (Hood, Spilka, Hunsberger & Gorsuch, 1996).In fact,
because of its beneficial value for an individual, following upon Gardner's theory of

pathol ogizing them out-of-hand because
they fail to conform to one's preconceptions about reality. This caution extends to
the application of diagnostic categories to
individuals. For example, according to the

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Fourth Edition) "belief in
clairvoyance" that is to say, belief that reBaltijos PSIHOLOQIJAS ZUnwAhS nei.

multiple intelligences

(1

983), spirituality

has been conceptualised as a form of intel-

ligence, namely spiritual intelligence. Spiritually intelligent individuals are those
who have the capacity for "transcendence," for entering "heightened spiritual sta-
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tes of consciousness,"
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day

for investing everylife with "a sense of the sacred," for

seek other sources of meaning. One way
to understand the possibility of such reo-

iso-

using "spiritual resources to solve problems

wn

in living," and for "virtuous behavior" (Em-

rientation, is to consider the cognitive, motivational and behavioural patterns of religiosity that have been measured in the past.
The extrinsic orientation is characterized
by an attitude of expediency, so that one's
religious observances are superficial, not
integrated into one's daily life, and used in
the service of utilitarian needs such as social advancement. The intrinsic orientation
is characterizedby a commitment to a lived religiosity that provides one with meaning. Quest orientation is characterized by

p. 164). For all its benefits,

En-

mons, 1999,

so-

there are nonetheless

ICe

son may encounter concerning

re-

That spirituality is not pathological but that

'in

it can involve problems that may come to

ll-

the attention of mental health practitioners

difficulties that a perspirituality.

,te

is recognized by its inclusion in the section "Other Conditions That May Be a Focus of Clinical Attention" of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Di-
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gious or Spiritual Problem" (American
Psychiatnc Association, 1994, p. 685).
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What are some of these problems?

ilt
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First of all, it is useful to make the distinction between religion and spirituality
as the distinction between "adherence to
the beliefs and practices of an organi zed
religious institution" and a person's relationship to a pu{portedly existent transcendent reality without regard for religious
creeds (Lukoff, Lu & Turner, 1 996,p.234).
Furtherrnore, for many people, the notion
of spirituality includes the idea that one is
on a journey of self-transformation in
which specific practices such as meditation
are used in order to experience transcendent states of consciousness in which existential questions are eventually to be answered (BaruSs, 1996). There can be differences in the types of problems associated

with religious observance and spirituality.
For example, loss of one's faith in the religious doctrines that one has previously come to accept is a known religious problem

(Lukoff, Lu & Turner, 1996). However,
while loss of faith may be a religious problem, it can also be a spiritual opportunity
in the sense that it challenges a person to

confrontation with existential issues, refusal to reduce the complexity of life, and an
ongoing search for truth wherever it may
be found. For those with a quest orientation, religious doubt is perceived to be a

positive characteristic (Hood, Spilka,
Hunsberger & Gorsuch, 1996). In other
words, one's loss of faith may result in the

loss of intrinsic religiosity but open the
door to quest and self-transformation. Interestingly enough, there has also been some movement in the other direction toward

fundamentalism (Hood, Spilka, Hunsberger & Gorsuch, 1996) perhaps from a need
to reduce the burden of self-determination

in the face of complexity (cf. Schwartz,
2000).

A crisis of any sort can sometimes become an existential crisis and precipitate a
spiritual awakening. In such cases, regarding any difficulties that arise for a person
as traditional psychopathologies can be
harmful to her. Thus it is wqrthwhile to distinguish between regressive pathologies,

which are characterrzed by an inability to
function nonnally within those spheres within which nonnal functioning would be expected, and progressive pathologies, which
arise from spiritual awakening or aspira-
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tion (Baru5s, 1996). However, some spiritual events can be so overwhehning that
they create disruptions in a person's ability to carry out the normal activities of her
life. The terrn "spiritual emergence" has
been used for reasonably benign manifestations of spiritual awakening, while the
term "spiritual emergency" has been used

for those that are more traumatic (Lukoff,
Lu & Turner, 1996, p. 238). In extreme ca-

"spiritual emergencies
with psychotic features" has been used (Lukoff, 1996, p. 27I).
One of the most dramatic forms of spiritual awakening, which responds poorly
to classical Western psycJriatric treatment
but well to treatments specifically designed for it, is that of kundalini rising. In the
Hindu tradition, kundalini is an energy that
purportedly rises from the base of the spine to the head at some point in a person's
spiritual development. In some cases, kundalini experiences appear to occur spontaneously or as a result of experimentation
with yoga and breathing exercises (Scotton, 1996). Healthy symptoms of kundalini awakening can include the following:
sensations of ener1y, heat, or light that
rush up the spine . . . a perception of inner
sound often likened to the buzzing of bees
or the roar of a waterfall . . . perception of
intense white light . . . aprofound mystical
experience which can include union with
the divine, spiritual revelation, creative inses, the designation

sight, prophetic or psychic visions, or a profound expansion of consciousness. (Kason

& Degler, 1994, p. 24)
However, a mental health practitioner
may also see "bradycardia . . .) tachycardia, cool skin, flushed skin, spontaneous
trance states, and spontaneous assumption
of yogic postures." Treatment can include
reassurance by the clinician and immersion
Baltijus PSIHOLOQIJAS ZUfuNALS /sei.

in mundane tasks so as to "refocus atten
tion on the ordinary world" (Scotton, 1996
p.26Q.

Inauthenticity
Authenticity refers to a person being self,
determining and acting on the basis of her
own understanding (Baru5s, 1996). In so.
me cases, spirituality can be inauthentic
Spiritual defences are spiritual beliefs tha
constrain a person so that she is unable tc
express herself (Battista , 1996). However
one has to be careful in how one deals witk
spiritual defences. The natural tendencies
that are constrained may themselves be des-

tructive, such as tendencies toward drue
abuse. Ideally one would like to encountet
and transform one's natural tendencies in
a constructive direction (Assagioli, 1988r
1991 ; Ferrucci, 1982). Offbnsive spirituality refers to the imposition of oneself on
others as someone who is spiritually developed, perhaps in order to coopt others for
the maintenance of one's own spiritual
identity (Battista, 1996). Clearly, there can
also be a point at which self-righteous imposition of one's beliefs on others becomes offensive.
A more dangerous version of inauthenticity is one in which one abdicates respon-

sibility for oneself to such an extent that
there is no critical evaluation of the doctrines of the religious org anization with which
one has become affiliated. In fact, cults are

charactertzed by the suppression of criticism of the fundamental beliefs of the cult's
adherents (Baru5s, 1996). Someone who
dares to criticrze a cult's dogma or its leaders risks being branded as being selfish
or evil and subjected to efforts to correct
her aberrant behaviour. If she persists in
failing to comply with the expectations of

1., Nr. 1., 2000./
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atten-

the cult and leaves, she may be told that
she has failed the test, that she is darnned
and that she has lost her opportunity for
enlightenment. "Feeling totally alone, the
ex-cult member fmay experience] a turmoil
of feelings: rage at the betrayal, fear of retaliation,, horror at the possibility of perpetual damnation, grief at the loss of group
support and affectioo, and shame at having
been duped" (Deikman, 1996,p. 317). The
attendant anxiety, depression and loss of
self-confidence can bring ex-cult members
into therapy.
These psychological dynamics of inauthenticity are not confined to recognrzable
cults such as the "The People's Temple . . .
the Moonies and the Krishna devotees" but
are found throughout our society such as
in "large corporations, political groups,
professional organi zattons' government bo-
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wealth, and rampant consumerism. The penalties for dissent may differ but the same
reliance on coercive strategies can be identified (e.g., Cialdini, 1988). Even the scien-
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1996, p. 321). For example,

'

tific community is not exempt from cultlike behaviour in that there is a version of
science known as scientism whereby one
is expected to believe that the universe is
essentially a physical place, that the fixed
methods used in science are the only way
in which anything can be known, and that
all talk of spirituality and transcendence is
nonsense (Baruis, 1996). Those who fail
to acquiesce are sometimes nudged out of
the system by being refused research funding, by rejection of their work for publication, and by being barred from hiring and

promotion.

Indeed, our whole society can be
thought of as a cult. Our normal waking
state of consciousness can be regarded as

pathological; as a state of consciousness
in which we are labouring under the delusion that the everyday world is real when,
in fact, it is not. And our 'oculture can be
viewed as a vast conspiracy against selfknowledge and awakening in which we collude together to reinforce one another's defences and insanity" (Walsh, 1984, p. 58).

According to this perspective, the waking
state is not only not optimal, but a state of
psychosis. Or at least, the noffilal waking
state is an imperfect state superseded by
more enlightened states. Now, these are
dramatic claims. Is there any evidence for
them? The superiority of transcendent states relative to the norrnal waking state is a
contention that has been made by many of
those who have experienced transcendent
states of consciousness (e.g., Merrell-

Wolff, 1994; 1995a; 1995b; Roberts, I 993;
1991 ; Wren-Lewis, 1988 ,1994). In that regard, let us consider the experiences and
philosophy of Merrell-Wol ff.
Franklin Merrell-Wolff was born in
1887. After studies in mathematics and philosophy, and a year of teaching mathematics, he left a promising academic career in
order to seek "atranscendent mode of consciousness that could not be comprehended

within the limits of our ordinary forms of
knowledge" (Merrell-Wolff, 1994, pp.
251-252)" Twenty-four years of effort were rewarded in 1936 with the occllrrence
of two fundamental realizations whose effects persisted until his death in 1985. For
Merrell-Wolff, the structure of events in
transcendent states of consciousness is different from that within the everyday mode
because the subject-object duality that cha-
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racterizes the manner in which we ordina-

rily think is superseded by consciousness
without an object. There is an analogous
change in the manner in which we can
know something. Whereas there are only
the two processes of sensory perception and

rational thinking in our ordinary state of
consciousness, a third mode of knowledge, char acterized by identification with that
which is known, becomes possible in transcendent states. There is a "shift in the base
of consciousness" (Meme11-Wolff, 1 994, p.
264) from oneself as implanted in the relative domain to being "forcibly removed and
instantaneously transplanted into a supernal region" (Menetl-Wolff, 1994, p.264).
The everyday consciousness, which we assume to be real, turns out to be only apparently real, whereas the ground of being
experienced in transcendent states of consciousness, which seems ephemeral from
our everyday point of view, turns out to be
acfually real. Merrell-Wolff has used the
analogy of a mirage in the desert to characterize this ontological inversion: "when
one realizes a given condition is an illu-

it not only ceases to be, but ceases
ever to have existed" (Merrell-Wolff,
sion,

I995a, p. 23).

Another pervasive manifestation of
inauthenticity in the context of transcendence involves undue respect for subjective imagery that is regarded as arising from
a superior level of being. Merrell-Wolff
maintained that there is a mode of knowledge in addition to sensory perception and
rational thought. The notion that we have
superior modes of knowledg e avatlable to
us is not an unpopular idea. In a 1986 survey BaruSs and Moore found that 55o/o of
334 academics and professionals who
could potentially write about consciousness
in the academic literature, agreed that "the-

re are modes of understanding latent within a person which are superior to rational
thought" (BaruSs, 1990, p. 17 6). In a subsequent survey in 1996 at an international
academic consciousness conference, 69%
of 2I2 participants agreed with the same
statement (BaruSs & Moore, 1998). For
Merrell-Wolff, a superior mode of knowledge was activated in the course of a radical shift in the base of consciousness to a
transcendent state. Another way of conceptualising the activity of a superior mode of
knowledge has been to think of the perfu-

sion of the nonnal waking consciousness
or slightly altered states of consciousness'
such as sleep, with insights from a superconscious domain (Assagioli, 1965). In other words, one may experience intuitioll.
In unfolding one's potential as part of a process of self-transformation, oie may deliberately seek to develop one's intuition and
to pay attention to the guidance that it provides. The point here is not to discourage
the effort to seek to acquire knowledge that

is superior to rational thought but to point
out the danger of uncritically trusting the
mental images that are assumed to be that
knowledge. There is also a related danger
in becoming dependent on guidance thereby relinquishing one's capacity for crea-

tivity and self-determination, both ofwhich
are constituent qualities of a whole human
being (BaruSs, 1996).

Dissociation
There is a more explicit version of guidance that of channelling accompanied by trance. Channelling is the process by which a
person believes herself to be acting as a
channel for information from discarnate entities (Hane graaff, 1996). And trance is the

physiological and psychological state in
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which a person finds herself in the course
of channelling (cf. Lambek, 1989). Clearly
the definition of trance is circular. The
problem is that the physiological, cognitive, emotional and behavioural dimensions
of trance are not well understood (Walsh,
1995). In some cases, behaviour during
trance has been identified as possession
(Pattison, Kahan & Hurd, 1986). On the
other hand we could reconceptualise pos-

3p-

session as dissociation. Someone who pe-
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riodically manifests a constellation of be-

fu)ss,

haviours, including her expressed self-identity, that is significantly different from her
norunal self, can be considered a candidate
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for Dissociative Identity Disorder (Kluft,
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1996). Such reconceptualisation masks the
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led information external or internal (BaruSs, 1996)? If we refrain from pathomorphism and set aside our preconceptions, that
question has to be answered on a case by
case basis. In many cases, the answer will
remain unknown. And in many cases, it
may be difficult to determine if the channelling is detrimental or beneficial to the
person doing the channelling. However, to
the extent that channelling is inauthentic,
it may not be beneficial.

of the population (Miller, 1994). In other
words, the prevalence of alien abduction
experiences appears to be of the same order of magnitude as the lifetime prevalence of schizophrenia. If that is true, why
don't we see these cases? The answer is
that no one in her right mind would admit
to a mental health practitioner that she believes that she has been abducted by aliens.
Noting that those in their right mind
would not report alien encounters leads to
the observation that "assessment by both
clinical examination and standar dizedtests
has shown that, as a group, abduction experients are not different from the general
population in terms of psychopathology
prevalence" (Appelle, Lynn & Newman,
2000, p.268). Experients do, however, often have various physical and psychological problems, such as post-traumatic stress
disorder, that appear to follow upon alien
abduction experiences. And they appear to
have more adjustment probleffiS, including
an unusually high rate of reported suicide

attempts (Appelle, Lynn & Newm 4n,
2000). In addition to the failure to find
psychopathology that could account for the
abduction experience, Mack (1994) has given four additional arguments why abduc-

ties, usually to a location interpreted as an

tion phenomena cannot be explained in
psychiatric terms. First, reports from abductees in the United States who have had
no contact with one another are nonetheless similar even with respect to details that
have not been widely publicized. Second,
there are physical signs associated with abduction experiences such as the physical

an-

alien spacecraft . . . where individuals are

absence of abductees during the time of ab-

ha

subjected to complex physical and psycho-

SA
en-

logical procedures" (Appelle, Lynn 8.
Newman,2000, p. 254). The lifetime pre-

duction as reported by witnesses; "nosebleeds and various cuts, scoop marks, bruises and other complexly patterned skin le-

the

valence of alien abduction experiences has
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been estimated at between .04oA and 2.00oh

ea-

ich
Ian

Some of the most enigmatic cases in altered states of consciousness are those of
people claiming to have been abducted by

aliens.
charac

Alien abduction experiences

are

terizedby "subj ectively real memo-

ries of being taken secretly and/or against
one's will by apparently non-human entian-

sions;" and implants found after abduction
experiences, although none of these im-
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plants has been proved to be of non-biological origin. Third, abduction accounts occur in children who are too young for the
psychiatric syndromes that are assigned to
abduction experients. Fourth, abduction experiences have often been associated with
sightings of unidentified flying objects either by the experient or other witnesses. In
spite of those arguments, are alien abduction accounts just products of an overactive imagination? Perhaps. However, abductees are not high on hypnotisability or fantasy proneness as one would expect if these narratives were fantasies that had become indistinguishable from reality Appelle,

Lynn & Newman, 2000).

Drug-Induced Phenomena
Clearly, psychotropic drugs can induce or
affect altered states of consciousness. Sometimes the effects are clearly pathological. Such is the case with Substance-Induced Sleep Disorders, which can result from
intoxication with drugs such as alcohol,
amphetamines, caffeine, cocaine, opioids,
sedatives or other substances (American
Psychiatric Association, 1994). For example, fluoxetine, a bicyclic antidepressant
that inhibits the reuptake of serotonin, has
been found to interfere with sleep. In one
study of patients with major depression
being treated with fluoxetine, all 4l participants had increased eye movements relative to their premedication condition according to at least one measure of oculomotor activity,33 had increased muscle tension, and 14 had both increased eye movements and muscle tension in all sleep stages. Other studies have shown that these
effects appear not to remit with termina-

tion of drug use indicating that fluoxetine
may have long-term effects on the central

neryous system (Armitage, Trivedi & Rush,

1995). In the case of fluoxetine we have a
treatment for psychopathology that itself
produce s psychopathology.

Other psychoactive drugs, notably some psychedelics, may have net beneficial
effects. The purpose here is to discuss the
neuropsychological effects of such drugs
without regard for their legal status in different jurisdictions. In no way should what
is said here be construed as endorsement
for the use of illegal drugs. Not only is illegal drug use illegal, but potentially dangerous to the user, given that she is unlikely to know exactly what it is that she is
ingesting. For example, the drug 4-methoxyamphetamine "has often been passed off
as the love drug MDA fmethylenedioxyamphetamine], though it is ten times more powerful and has killed many of its
users" (Lavigne, 1999, p.373).
An example of the beneficial effects of
psychedelics was observed in what has become the most famous experiment in the
psychology of religion, the Good Friday ex-

periment. On April 20, 1962, ten divinity
students were each given 30 milligrams of
the psychedelic psilocybin before a Good
Friday service. In evaluations done immediately after the drug experience and at six
month and 24 to 27 year follow-upS, the
investigators found that the experiences of
the participants had had genuinely mystical features and that these experiences had
been evaluated by the participants as having been important to their spiritual lives
(Pahnke, 1963; Doblin, l99l ). For example, Mike Young has said that he had found
that "religious ideas that were interesting
intellectually before . . . fwere now] connected to something much deeper than be-

lief and theory" (quoted in Malmgren,
1994,
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p. 1F). According to Young, direct
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personal experience had allowed him to va-

cesses are ones leading to eventual excep-

lidate his religious ideas. While psychedelic experiences appear to have not had ne-

tional well-being as discussed, for example, with regard to religious or spiritual

arly the impact that some drug-free transcendent experiences can have (Smith &
Taft, 1998), they have, in some situations,
promoted exceptional well-being.

problems. Problems encountered in altered
states of consciousness may be progressive rather than regressive so that traditional
diagnostic categories and treatment strategies are inapplicable. Perhaps the concept
of psychopathology is not a useful one for
experiences in altered states of consciousness and, rather than trying to apply the
schemata of pathology and health, a mental health practitioner can simply assist a
client to develop in constructive directions
irrespective of the nature of the experiences themselves. This requires a good understanding of the varieties of human experiences in altered states of consciousness

Criteria for Pathology
Where does this leave us? How can we recognrze psychopathology of altered states
of consciousness? Shedding the problem
of pathomorphism, our task becomes a dif-

ficult one. The unusual nature of a person's
experiences is not proof of aberrance so
that a mental health practitioner must listen with care to a client's account without
restrictive preconceptions. Degree of adjustment is also not a reliable indicator of

and the development of a keen sense of
discrimination.

psychopathology since adjustment could be
impaired even though the underlying pro-
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